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Although young children typically have trouble reasoning relationally, they are aided by the
presenceof“relational”words(e.g.,GentnerandRattermann,1991).Theyalsoreasonwell
about commonly experienced event structures (e.g., Fivush, 1984).To explore what makes
aword“relational”andthereforehelpfulinrelationalreasoning,wehypothesizedthatthese
words activate well-understood event structures. Furthermore, the activated schema must
be open enough (without too much speciﬁcity) that it can be applied analogically to novel
problems.Fourexperimentsexaminethishypothesisbyexploring:howtrainingwithalabel
inﬂuence the schematic interpretation of a scene, what kinds of scenes are conducive to
schematic interpretation, and whether children must ﬁgure out the interpretation them-
selves to beneﬁt from the act of interpreting a scene as an event. Experiment 1 shows
the superiority of schema-evoking words over words that do not connect to schematized
experiences. Experiments 2 and 3 further reveal that these words must be applied to per-
ceptual instances that require cognitive effort to connect to a label rather than unrelated
or concretely related instances in order to draw attention to relational structure. Experi-
ment 4 provides evidence that even when children do not work out an interpretation for
themselves, just the act of interpreting an ambiguous scene is potent for relational general-
ization.The present results suggest that relational words (and in particular their meanings)
are created from the act of interpreting a perceptual situation in the context of a word.
Keywords: schemas, analogy, labels, relational reasoning, cognitive development
INTRODUCTION
The importance of language to higher cognition is undisputed:
words help learners connect previously acquired ideas (Herbert
and Hayne, 2000) and move from concrete to more abstract
representations (Kotovsky and Gentner, 1996; Loewenstein and
Gentner, 2005). Effects of language on children’s cognition have
been demonstrated in several domains in cognitive development
(e.g., Miura and Okamoto, 1989; Choi and Bowerman, 1991;
Levine et al., 1992; Sinha et al., 1994) and appear particularly
potent in tasks that require more abstract encodings (Gelman,
1988;Waxman and Markow,1995; Bloom and Keil,2001)o rr e l a -
tional reasoning (Kotovsky and Gentner, 1996; Loewenstein and
Gentner, 2005; Gentner et al., 2011).
Threemetaphorsareoftenusedtodiscusstheeffectoflanguage
on cognition: (1) language as a lens, (2) language as an anchor or
guide, and (3) language as a cognitive tool. The lens metaphor is
related to classic Whorﬁan ideas, and captures the idea that the
words one knows inﬂuences the information that is detected and
howitisrepresented(Winaweretal.,2007;Boroditskyetal.,2011).
The anchor (Clark, 1998; Lupyan, 2005) or guide (Plunkett et al.,
2008)metaphorsuggeststhatlanguageaidscategoryformationby
explicitly connecting related instances or by deﬁning boundaries,
as when, for example, three dogs are all given the same label (e.g.,
Xu and Tenenbaum, 2007; Perry et al., 2010). The third, referred
to as the tool metaphor, captures how language leverages other
cognitive processes, for example, the comparison or alignment of
elements (Kotovsky and Gentner, 1996; Loewenstein and Gen-
tner, 2005; Gentner et al., 2011) such that similarity-based and
analogical processes may act on these newly encoded representa-
tions. These perspectives on language suggest two broad types of
words that may foster relational reasoning: novel words that can
be helpful despite the lack of associations and known words that
are helpful because of their rich semantic associations. The pur-
pose here is to explore what types of words facilitate thinking and
which situations beneﬁt from the presence of those words.
Thespeciﬁcresearchquestionsaremotivatedbyﬁndingsabout
the difﬁculty of relational reasoning tasks for young children and
novices. Preschool children, in particular, have difﬁculty picking
out relevant relational information when there are other more
salientobjectfeatures(e.g.,KeilandBatterman,1984;Gentnerand
Rattermann,1991).Theliteratureonrelationalreasoninginyoung
children has repeatedly shown that words help children notice,
comprehend, and make use of relations (Gelman, 1988; Gentner
and Rattermann,1991; Kotovsky and Gentner,1996; Loewenstein
andGentner,2005).Manyof thesetasksmakeuseof novelorarbi-
trary relational reasoning problems. For instance, in Rattermann
et al. (1990) work, they showed that labeling a series of objects
varying in size as “daddy, mother, and baby” helped preschool-
ers reason about size relations. The child might need to discover
thatthe“winner”inachoicetaskisalwaysthemiddle-sizedobject
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regardlessofthespeciﬁcobjectsortheirabsolutesizes.Thus,words
might help in these tasks because they help the child relate the
novel task to known relational structures (e.g., size differences in
families, Rattermann et al., 1990) or because words, even novel
words, help children discover the relational structure (Gentner
et al.,2011).
However, there is another context in which young children
have been shown to reason relationally and with relative ease:
well-understood events, such as buying fast food or going to the
movies.Theresearchinthatliteraturesuggeststhatchildren’srela-
tional reasoning derives from their schema-like representations of
event structure (Fivush, 1984; Gobbo and Chi, 1986; Bauer and
Mandler, 1989; Hudson et al., 1992). Schemas are “abstract” or
“variable-ized”cognitive entities (Schank andAbelson,1995). For
example,buyingfastfoodhasacommonstructurethatiscaptured
in a “fast food restaurant schema” across the variety of speciﬁc
fast food experiences in a young child’s life but each visit also
has unique features. In brief, schemas are theoretical constructs
that can be roughly deﬁned as structured representations that
bringordertoemotions,perceptions,andexperiences(Rumelhart,
1975; Rumelhart and Ortony, 1977). Schemas and closely related
notionsofframes(Minsky,1975)andscripts(SchankandAbelson,
1977, 1995) are organized slots ﬁlled by different units of knowl-
edgesuitablyrepresentinginformationrequiredforrespondingto
structurally similar situations.
Given these contexts in which children are able to reason
relationally (in the presence of words or with well-understood
“schematized” events), these experimental questions emerge: do
words beneﬁt children’s performances in situations such as arbi-
traryrelationaltasksusedinlaboratorystudiesbecausetheyfoster
schema-like interpretations? If so, is there, a “sweet spot” in the
knowledgestructuresthatwordsmightactivate–notsoempty(as
might be the case with novel words), that the word provides no
relational structure, but also not so speciﬁc that the knowledge is
of a rich and detailed experience rather than a variable-ized and
therefore generalizable relational structure?
Toanswertheﬁrstquestion,weproposetheSchemahypothesis:
words that draw upon rich past experiences evoke schemas, well-
understood, structure-sensitive event structures, and these enable
relationalthinking.Standardrelationaltasksusedwithyoungchil-
drenare(particularlysofromthechild’spointofview)ambiguous.
Words, through their meanings and through their associations
withpreviouslyexperiencedrelationalstructures,mightinvitepar-
ticular interpretations that resolve the ambiguity in some mean-
ingful way. These interpretations – if properly structured in terms
of theirrelations–maythenenablechildrentoreasonanalogically
about structural similarities despite surface differences.
If the Schema Hypothesis holds, one might expect that calling
upon a highly familiar event structure would be most helpful in
promoting relational interpretations. However, if children recall
a highly ﬁxed and speciﬁed narrative rather than a story-schema
with slots in its structure, they may be unable to apply it to the
present relational problem and thus less likely to respond accord-
ingtorelationalsimilarity(Brownetal.,1986).Moregenerally,for
any evoked relational structure to beneﬁt reasoning, it may have
to have open slots and not be so speciﬁc that the slots are already
ﬁlled in. Accordingly, there might be a need for optimal openness
in the activated schema in order to support relational reasoning:
children must know enough about the event structure to make
inferential use about it but without too much speciﬁcity so that it
can be applied analogically to novel problems. This idea ﬁts with
recent ﬁndings showing that children have difﬁculty attending to
relations when they are distracted by more vivid concrete infor-
mation (Kaminski et al., 2008; Son et al., 2008, 2011; McNeil et
al., 2009). Thus, the experiments test what we call the Optimal
Vagueness hypothesis: the key prediction is that less speciﬁed,less
concrete,andsparselydetailedschemasmaybetterdirectattention
to relational structure than richly detailed concrete situations.
The four experiments that follow tested the Schema hypoth-
esis and the Optimal Vagueness hypothesis by examining 4- and
5-year-old children’s relational reasoning in a task that has been
commonlyusedtostudyrelationalreasoninginchildren.Ourver-
sion is based on a prior study by Kotovsky and Gentner (1996).
In that study, 4-year-olds were presented with a triad of cards, a
standardandtwoanswerchoices–therelationalmatchandanon-
relational foil. The standard presented a relation among a set of
threeobjects(e.g.,asymmetryrelationasinoOo).Theelementsin
the answer choices were similar to each other (e.g., xXx and xxX)
but differed from the standard to ensure that the only commonal-
itysharedbythestandardandtherelationalanswerwasarelation.
When the relational answer was in the same dimension (i.e. size
symmetry, oOo and xXx), they found that 4-year-olds succeeded
in responding to relations such as symmetry. However when the
relational dimension changed (i.e.,oOo and light blue-dark blue-
light blue) or the relational polarity changed (i.e., oOo and XxX),
children’s performance did not statistically differ from chance. In
ordertohelpthesechildrenrespondrelationallyonthesemoredif-
ﬁcult cross-dimensional triads,Kotovsky and Gentner introduced
thetaskbycategorizingtriadsusinglinguisticlabels(e.g.,“even”to
indicate symmetry). They found that children who succeeded on
the labeling task were then more likely to make relational choices
on the difﬁcult cross-dimension triads. The relational patterns in
the studies that follow are made from three objects and are, like
those of Kotovsky and Gentner,abstract–as y m m e t r ical arrange-
ment (ABA) or an asymmetrical arrangement (BAA). In contrast
to the Kotovsky and Gentner methods, we used a lexical gener-
alization task, ﬁrst teaching children names for one instance of a
pattern and then asking how they generalized that name to new
instances. Across experiments, we manipulate the kinds of words
used to understand how words might evoke schemas that aid in
the interpretation of these relations structures.
EXPERIMENT 1: LABELS THAT PROVIDE SCHEMAS
Experiment 1 tested the Schema hypothesis by labeling the cards
with words whose meaning and associated referents might evoke
the proper relational interpretation and comparing the effects of
these potentially meaningful labels to the effects of two kinds of
novel words. The schema-evoking labels were chosen to be words
that (1) refer to well-organized events for young children and (2)
havepotentiallyrelevantrelationalmeaningsthatmighthelpchil-
dreninterpretthestimulusarraysinanappropriateway.TheABA
pattern,as shown in Figure1,is made of two matching objects on
eithersideof auniquecenterobject.Weconceptualizedthiscenter
object as a toy potentially worthy of sharing. For the symmetric
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FIGURE 1 | Named instances ofABA and BAA shown to children
during training.
pattern,the word chosen to evoke the relevant relational interpre-
tation was “sharing” because sharing events are well-understood
by children in terms of balance, fairness, and the sameness of
two compared entities. This may have been the intuition that led
KotovskyandGentner(1996)tousetheterm“even”(fortheirABA
ﬁgures) which evokes a similar set of concepts. The asymmetric
BAApattern,asshowninFigure1,alwaysincludesoneitemonthe
left that is different from the rest. We conceptualized this unique
object to be a vehicle that might be pulling the other two objects.
Thus to support this relational interpretation, we chose the word
“pulling”becausethisword(perhapsespeciallytoyoungchildren)
might evoke ideas of a lead object and followers such as an engine
pulling freight cars. Note that these words (like “daddy, mommy,
baby” in previous studies of labels and relational learning, Rat-
termann et al., 1990) are merely evocative. The relational displays
do not actually show an object being shared or an engine being
engaged in pulling. However, if children possess schemas that are
sufﬁciently abstract concerning these kinds of events, then the
words “sharing” and “pulling” might elicit the relevant relational
interpretations.
The two control conditions used novel words that might
be expected to help relational reasoning by the guide or tool
metaphors. In the Arbitrary Word condition, two novel nonsense
words were used (i.e., “koli” for ABA; “teemo” for BAA); this
condition serves as a control for any general effects of naming.
Because the arbitrary words could be hard to learn and to link to
the relations (which is presumably not the case for “pulling” and
“sharing”), the second control condition provided iconic words
that were mimetically related to the relations they labeled (Imai
et al., 2008; Yoshida, in press) in terms of their phonetic form.
Thatis,“ko-li-ko”wasusedforABApatternsand“tee-mo-mo”for
BAA. These words, however, are not expected to evoke relational
events that are well-known to children.
METHOD
Participants and design
Forty-fourchildren,averageage57months(range46–68months)
from daycares in a Midwest community participated in this
experiment. Three additional children were tested but two were
excluded from analysis due to unfavorable testing conditions (ﬁre
alarms)andtheotherchildhaddifﬁcultyduringthelabeltraining
(described in the procedures section). Children were randomly
assigned to one of the label conditions: Arbitrary (n =15), Iconic
(n =16),or Schema-evoking (n =13). In this experiment (as well
asthestudiesthatfollow),informedparentalconsentwasobtained
before data collection and all protocols were approved by local
institutional review boards.
Materials and procedure
Trainingconsistedsimplyofnamingcardsthatwereconstructedto
encourageaschematicconstrual(e.g.,sharingorpulling).Allpar-
ticipants were shown the training instances, two unique cards for
each relation for a total of four training instances. The ABA rela-
tion cards were cross–penguin–cross and triangle–bear–triangle;
the BAA cards were boat–rectangle–rectangle and car–diamond–
diamond as shown in Figure 1. ABA cards were labeled with the
same word/phrase, either “koli,”“ko-li-ko,” or “sharing” depend-
ing on the condition, and BAA cards were labeled with another
word/phrase, either“teemo,”“tee-mo-mo,”or“pulling.”
Experimenters showed each training card separately and said,
for example, “This is a koli card. See, this card is koli. Can you
say koli?” Note that all of the words were used in the adjective
formsothatthesamegrammaticalframecouldbeusedinallcon-
ditions. After waiting for the child to repeat the word or phrase,
the card was put away and the next card was named. The labels
and cards were not counterbalanced because the schema-evoking
and iconic words were speciﬁc to the particular relation that the
childrenwerebeingshown(Experiment4willfurtheraddressthis
issue). Because we could not counterbalance the words in some of
the conditions without changing the intent of the experiment, we
also did not do so for the arbitrary labels.
Afterchildrenweretrainedinbothtypesofrelations,theexper-
imenter began the testing phase of the study. Testing trials asked
children to ﬁnd a matching card to a given linguistic label (e.g.,
“Can you give me the sharing card?”). There were two kinds of
testing trials: memorization and generalization. All trials involved
a two-alternative forced choice.
Memorization trials were made up of the same objects as the
traininginstances(e.g.,bearsandtriangles,penguinsandcrosses).
A memory trial consisted of two answer choices: a card that was
identical to the original learning instance and a distracter that
containedthesameobjectsinadifferentpattern(e.g.,respectively,
cross–penguin–cross and penguin–cross–cross). On memory tri-
als, children were always asked to retrieve the card that was iden-
tical to its taught label. When children were taught that the card
depicting cross–penguin–cross was “koli/ko-li-ko/sharing,” they
were correct when they chose that card over the distracter (i.e.,
penguin–cross–cross). The memory trials were designed to test
whetherchildrenweresimplyabletolearntheassociationbetween
words and their referents from the brief training segment.
Generalization cards consisted of three simple geometric
shapes, as in Kotovsky and Gentner’s (1996) tasks, that re-created
the ABA and BAA relations with variations on color, shape, or
size dimensions (see Figure 2). The size dimension cards will be
referred to as“opposite polarity”cards because they had two large
objects and one small one, while all training instances were made
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FIGURE 2 |Test trials from Experiments 1 and 2.
up of two small objects and one large one.All generalization cards
were novel to the participants because they were not named or
shown during training. Pilot testing with generalization materials
showed that children did not systematically prefer the appropriate
relational example when asked for “sharing” and “pulling” cards
without training (n=7,M=0.48, SD=0.33).
After the brief four-card training (labeling of the exemplars),
children completed 8 memory trials and 12 lexical generaliza-
tion trials with the testing cards. On half of all of these trials,
childrenwereaskedtogettheABAcard(“Canyougetthekoli/ko-
li-ko/sharing card?”) and shown two answer choices, an ABA
(relational match) and BAA card (distracter) made of the same
objects. Children were asked for the BAA card on the other trials.
The testing order started off with four memory trials to make
the goal of the task clear, that is, to retrieve the object corre-
sponding to a particular name. Then they received three blocks of
generalization trials interspersed with two memory trials. Color,
shape, and opposite polarity trials were not blocked but instead
presented in two pseudo-random orders.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Children’smemoryandgeneralizationperformancesareshownin
Table 1. A 2 (test: memory, generalization)×3 (label condition:
Arbitrary, Iconic, Schema-evoking) repeated-measures ANOVA,
revealed a main effect of test, F(1, 41)=20.69, p<0.001, par-
tial η2 =0.34, and label condition, F(2, 41)=18.22, p<0.001,
partial η2 =0.47, but no interaction, F(2, 41)=0.62. As with
mosttestsof learning,memorizationperformanceexceedednovel
generalization.
Bonferroni corrected post hoc comparisons revealed that chil-
drentrainedwithSchema-evokinglabelsshowedsigniﬁcantlybet-
termemorizationthanchildrenineithertheIconic,t(28)=11.68,
p<0.05, or Arbitrary conditions, t(27)=14.91, p<0.01. These
two conditions did not differ signiﬁcantly, t(30)=0.42. Perfor-
mance in each of the three conditions exceeded chance levels on
the memorization test, ts>4.31,ps<0.001.
Table 1 | Means (and SDs) from the label conditions tested in
Experiment 1.
Memory trials Generalization trials n
Arbitrary label
(Koli/Teemo)
0.71* (0.19) 0.54 (0.12) 15
Iconic label
(Ko-Li-Ko/Tee-Mo-Mo)
0.75* (0.17) 0.64* (0.12) 16
Schema-evoking label
(sharing/pulling)
0.94* (0.12) 0.85* (0.20) 13
*Performance that statistically differed from chance (0.5) at p<0.001.
The analyses of generalization trials also revealed that children
in the Schema-evoking condition made signiﬁcantly more rela-
tional matches than children in either the Iconic, t(28)=12.20,
p<0.01, or Arbitrary conditions, t(27)=28.82, p<0.001. These
results support the schema hypothesis that words have their
effect by evoking relationally relevant interpretations. Addi-
tionally, children in the Iconic label condition chose relational
matches to the given label more often than those with Arbi-
trary label training, t(30)=6.34, p<0.05. Although the Iconic
andSchema-evokinggeneralizationperformancesreliablydiffered
fromchance,ts>5.86,ps<0.001,theArbitraryconditiondidnot,
t(14)=1.7.ThispatternsuggestssomebeneﬁttoIconiclabels,that
is,a sensitivity by the children to the correspondence of the sound
to visual patterns.
The advantage of the Schema-evoking condition on general-
ization test could, as hypothesized, be due to increased relational
interpretations; however, because children in the Schema condi-
tion also performed better on the memory trials, better general-
izationperformancecouldsimplyreﬂectmorerobustmemoryfor
the trained label. To examine this issue, the following analyses on
generalization performance included memory performance as a
covariate. Memory performance was only a marginally signiﬁcant
covariate, F(1, 40)=3.34, p<0.10, and there was still a signif-
icant effect of label condition even when memory performance
was included ﬁrst in a stepwise linear regression, F(2, 40)=8.75,
p<0.01,partial η2 =0.30.
The superior generalization performance by children who
heard meaningful event-related words supports the hypothesis
that schema-evoking words enhance children’s ability to appre-
hend the common relational structure across novel instances. The
choice of schema-evoking words such as “sharing” and “pulling”
to refer to ABA and BAA patterns is similar to Gentner and Rat-
termann’s (1991) and Rattermann et al.’s (1990) use of the word
“daddy” and “baby” to help young children respond to size rela-
tions. Words like “sharing” or “daddy” may foster analogical rea-
soning by reminding children of relevant event structures. These
words conveniently emphasize relations because the schemas they
activate are both well-known and consist of well-structured rela-
tionsthathavebeenappliedtomultipleindividualinstancesinthe
past, though never to such abstract displays as used in this exper-
iment. Nonetheless, evoking these relational frames may facilitate
processes such as alignment and comparison and thereby provide
an interpretive context within which to understand even novel or
perceptually ambiguous information.
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Children’s poor performance in the arbitrary and iconic con-
ditions suggests that word meaning does matter. However, the
comparison in Experiment 1 was between familiar words with
some meaning and novel made up words with none. The schema
hypothesis, however, implies that the meaning should be rela-
tionally relevant, not just familiar. Accordingly, Experiment 2
compared schema-evoking words with other meaningful, known
English words (also gerunds) that provide no obvious schematic
interpretationoftherelationalstructuresdisplayedinthestimulus
cards.
EXPERIMENT 2: MEANINGFUL YET UNRELATED WORDS VS.
SCHEMA-EVOKING WORDS
This experiment replicates the Schema-evoking condition of
Experiment 1 and compares performance to a new control group.
In this new condition, the labels were known English words that
were unrelated to the situation depicted on the card. Children saw
the training cards from Experiment 1 labeled as“boiling”forABA
cards and“eating”for BAA cards.
METHOD
Participants and design
Forty children, average age 60.5months (range 51–68months)
fromdaycaresinaMidwestcommunityparticipatedinthisexper-
iment. None of the children had participated in Experiment 1.
Five additional children were tested but three were excluded from
analysis because they exclusively chose an option on one side and
two for unfavorable testing conditions. Children were randomly
assigned to one of the label conditions: Unrelated (n =20) or
Schema-evoking (n =20).
Materials and procedure
The Schema-evoking condition was a replication of Experiment
1. In the Unrelated condition,ABA cards were labeled as“boiling”
and BAA cards were labeled as“eating.”
Label training, memory, and generalization testing procedures
weresimilartoExperiment1withafewminorchanges.Therewere
two pseudo-random orders for label training, half of the children
learning ABA cards ﬁrst (order: bear, penguin, boat, car) and the
otherhalflearningBAAcardsﬁrst(order:boat,car,bear,penguin).
After the brief four-card training (labeling of the exemplars),chil-
dren began the testing trials which consisted of 8 memory trials
and12lexicalgeneralizationtrialswiththetestingcards.Onhalfof
allofthesetrials,childrenwereaskedtogettheABAcard(“Canyou
get the boiling/sharing card?”). Children were asked for the BAA
card on the other trials (“Can you get the eating/pulling card?”).
The testing order began with four memory trials. Then each child
receivedthreeblocksof generalizationtrialsinterspersedwithtwo
blocks of memory trials. Generalization trials were blocked into
dimension-speciﬁc groups (color, shape, and opposite polarity)
and were presented in one of three orders (color–shape–polarity,
shape–polarity–color,and polarity–color–shape).
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
A 2 (test: memory, generalization)×2 (label condition: Unre-
lated, Schema-evoking) repeated-measures ANOVA revealed a
maineffectof test,F(1,38)=30.94,p<0.001,partialη2 =0.45,as
well as a signiﬁcant interaction, F(1, 38)=5.30, p<0.05, partial
η2 =0.12. Although, label conditions showed no differences on
memory test trials (see Table 2 for group means), there were sig-
niﬁcant differences in generalization performance, t(38)=2.55,
Bonferroni corrected p<0.05. Comparisons to chance perfor-
mance supported this analysis: generalization performance in the
Schema condition exceeded chance, t(19)=3.12, p<0.01, while
generalization by the Unrelated condition did not,t(19)=0.48.
Typically, developmental studies of analogy and language
examine the effect of particular labels on structural sensitivity
(e.g., Loewenstein and Gentner, 2005,s e eGentner and Ratter-
mann, 1991 for a review). The results here demonstrate that it is
not the mere use of a known word that cues relational judgments
but that words foster relational interpretations by dint of their
meanings. However, the question of the schematized meaning is
stillopen–musttheuseof thewordevokeaschema-likerepresen-
tation,that is a representation that is variable-ized,with slots,and
thusnottoospeciﬁc?Orcananyrelatedmeaning,includinghighly
concrete and speciﬁc meanings, also foster relational generaliza-
tion?ThisisthecruxoftheOptimalVaguenesshypothesistestedin
Experiment 3. Additionally, Experiment 3 implemented an alter-
native method for controlling for meaningfulness by applying the
labels“sharing”and“pulling”to unrelated training cards.
EXPERIMENT 3: OPTIMALLY VAGUE SCHEMAS?
By the Schema hypothesis, providing the words “pulling” and
“sharing” helped children because they activated relevant knowl-
edgeabouteventswiththerelevantrelationalproperties.Although
we used a central toy for “sharing” and a right-most vehicle for
“pulling”to foster a relational interpretation,the geometric forms
on the training instances are not actually good illustrations of
either “sharing” or “pulling” situations. Further, we know from
the performance of the children in the previous unrelated-control
conditions that the stimulus cards alone apparently are not sufﬁ-
cient to evoke the relevant schemas without the schema-evoking
labels. The relations that are presented by these cards, at best,
vaguelyresemble–orcouldbeseenasroughlysimilarto–pulling
orsharingevents.Althoughthesescenescanbeinterpretedasshar-
ing or pulling, this act of interpretation requires prompting – for
instance, by the provision of a relationally applicable label. The
Optimal Vagueness hypothesis suggests that the vagueness of the
resemblance – being evocative rather than highly similar – is a
virtue. The idea is that a well-speciﬁed example might empha-
size the objects in the example causing children not to see the
Table 2 | Means (and SDs) from the label conditions tested in
Experiment 2.
Memory trials Generalization trials n
Unrelated label
(boiling/eating)
0.72* (0.23) 0.46 (0.23) 20
Schema-evoking label
(sharing/pulling)
0.74* (0.19) 0.63♦ (0.20) 20
♦Performance that statistically differed from chance (0.5) at p<0.01.
*Performance that statistically differed from chance (0.5) at p<0.001.
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schema as having open slots and thus minimizing generalization.
That is, although the label “sharing” may evoke a familiar event
context to young children, the perceptual situation that receives
the label can lead to a vague and general idea of sharing or to a
speciﬁed instantiation of sharing. A vague and schematic under-
standing of sharing might be multiple parties equally wanting or
distributing something. Such a vague conceptualization might be
better for emphasizing relations rather than the speciﬁc objects
in the example. A more speciﬁc interpretation, for example, that
Sally and Susie want to share a teddy bear, might not help gener-
alization. Alternatively, one might argue that more speciﬁc (and
better understood) narratives might beneﬁt learning because it
would better activate the relevant underlying knowledge. Exper-
iment 3 tests these alternatives by training all children with the
schema-evoking labels (“sharing” and “pulling”) but applying
them to instances that richly, vaguely, or poorly, ﬁt with these
labels.
METHOD
Participants
Thirty-eight children, average age 57months (range 50–
68months)fromlocaldaycaresinaMidwesterntownparticipated
in this experiment. Five additional children were excluded (three
for unfavorable testing conditions; one reported by the teacher
to have developmental delays; one who exclusively chose cards
presented on one side). Children were randomly assigned to one
of three training card conditions: Unrelated (controls, n =12),
Speciﬁcally related (n =14), orVaguely related (n =13).
Materials and procedure
Inthisexperiment,thechildrenwereshowncardslabeledaseither
“sharing” or “pulling.” If these words (and whatever representa-
tions are activated) are powerful enough to promote relational
generalization, children in all three conditions should perform
equally well in the tasks. The difference among the conditions is
that there were three different types of cards that were labeled. If
the perceptual situation that receives the label contributes to the
interpretation of the activated schema, then there should be dif-
ferences in performance. Examples of the three types of training
cards are shown in Figure 3.
FIGURE 3 |Training cards for Experiment 2.
In the Speciﬁcally related condition, the training cards were
designed to concretely support children’s notions of “sharing”
(or “pulling”), with attention drawn to the speciﬁc entities par-
ticipating in the relation. “Sharing” cards portrayed scenes with
two children ﬂanking a stuffed animal in the middle. Instead of
vaguely being interpretable as a sharing situation, this perceptual
scene depicts a speciﬁc interpretation of sharing, namely that the
two children must be sharing the toy in the middle. However, the
training cards shown in the Vaguely related condition only evoke
an ambiguous sense of “sharing” because two geometric shapes
are ﬂanking a toy in the middle. This scene could be interpretable
in a number of ways,from the two shapes sharing the toy to more
generally activating notions of balance or dividing evenly. Unre-
lated training cards were similarly vague (two geometric shapes
ﬂanking an object in the center) but contained objects that would
be less interpretable by the label. For instance,an unrelated“shar-
ing” card depicted a cross–tree–cross. Presumably, this scene is
less related to“sharing”than cross–toy–cross because young chil-
dren probably think about sharing toys more often than sharing
trees.
Label training, memory, and generalization testing procedures
were similar to Experiment 2 with one major change. During
memory trials, each participant chose between condition-speciﬁc
cards (e.g., Speciﬁcally related participants chose between girl–
penguin–girl and penguin–girl–girl while Vaguely related partic-
ipants chose between cross–penguin–cross and penguin–cross–
cross cards). All children were asked for either “sharing” or
“pulling”cards in both memory and generalization trials because
they were all trained with these labels.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
A 2 (test: memory, generalization)×3 (training card condition)
repeated-measures ANOVA revealed no main effect of test, F(1,
36)=2.18,norcondition,F(2,36)=0.6,butasigniﬁcantinterac-
tion, F(2, 36)=4.64, p<0.05, partial η2 =0.21. A series of Bon-
ferronicorrectedposthoc comparisonswereconductedtoexamine
this interaction (see Table 3 for all group means). Although, the
three training conditions showed no differences on memory test
trials, they were signiﬁcantly different in generalization. Vaguely
related participants made signiﬁcantly more relational general-
izations than those in both Unrelated, t(24)=4.83, p<0.05,
and Speciﬁcally related conditions, t(26)=7.12, p<0.05. This
provides direct support for the OptimalVagueness hypothesis.
Table 3 | Means (and SDs) from the training conditions examined in
Experiment 3.
Memory trials Generalization trials n
Unrelated label 0.75♦ (SD=0.18) 0.63
‡
(SD=0.20) 12
Speciﬁcally related label 0.72
‡
(SD=0.29) 0.60 (SD=0.19) 14
Vaguely related label 0.70♦ (SD=0.22) 0.75♦ (SD=0.18) 13
‡Performance that statistically differed from chance (0.5) at p<0.05.
♦Performance that statistically differed from chance (0.5) at p<0.01.
Different cards were all labeled as “sharing” or “pulling.”
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Like Experiment 2, when known words are used, children are
able to remember the associated instances. Performance on mem-
ory trials showed that children were just as willing to attach
“sharing” and “pulling” to cards that were not quite obviously
related(theUnrelatedandVaguelyrelatedtraininginstances)asto
cards that exempliﬁed these labels (Speciﬁcally related instances).
The same words were used in all three conditions so the differ-
ence in generalization scores suggests that the interpretive match
betweenthewordsandinstancesiscritical.Thus,wecanconclude
that relational generalization is not solely fostered by the use of a
particularly apt word.Words associated with familiar,structurally
organized schemas are only part of the story; how those words
interact with the displays is also critical.
Relational generalization depends on the schematic interpre-
tations that join words and referents. Perceptual instances that
are appropriately vague, ones that can be interpreted in terms
of those familiar schemas but require effort to do so, allow chil-
dren to attend to relations within the schema. Displays that match
the well-known schema too well do not lead to relational gen-
eralizations; and neither do displays that are not interpretable in
terms of the schema. Thus, the match between a known schema
and a sufﬁciently ambiguous instance reﬂects optimal vagueness,
a “sweet spot” for transfer, because there is enough similarity
between label and referent to evoke relevant past instances but
enough abstractness to enable generalization to future instances.
Thus the problem with Speciﬁcally related training instances
may be this: what is interpretable using an obvious and literal
meaning of a word activates only a narrow understanding.Apply-
ing the word “sharing” to a speciﬁcally related instance may have
activated a concrete and speciﬁc notion of “sharing” such that
children did not engage in the act of adapting and interpreting,
and instead simply adopted the narrow construal. This conser-
vative strategy may simply be a prudent strategy because this
is also the least assumptive understanding (see also Medin and
Ross, 1989). The Vaguely related training instances may have fos-
teredgeneralizationbyengagingchildreninbroadeningtheirown
understanding of sharing, one that would also encompass future
instances.
Another possible beneﬁt of vagueness may be that it requires
interpretive work and optimal vagueness allows this additional
processing to yield a relational schematic perspective that can
be applied to future instances (McQuarrie and Mick, 1999). The
vaguely related situation (the combination of the word and visual
stimulus) may engage children in ﬁguring out why the cross–
penguin–cross situation is a sharing situation. In the Speciﬁcally
relatedcondition,theﬂankinggirlsarereadilyinterpretedasshar-
ing the penguin, so relatively little cognitive gain is achieved
by using the “sharing” terminology. Consistent with this idea,
researchers have found shallow learning when children (Martin
and Schwartz,2005;Martin,2009) and adults (Ross and Kennedy,
1990; Chi et al., 1994) are not given the opportunity to do the
work of re-interpreting something as something else. Text com-
prehension research has also found that poorly written text that
forces knowledgeable readers to cognitively work to ﬁnd coher-
ence promotes comprehension (McNamara et al., 1996). Perhaps
atooliteralinstantiationof aschemamaynotnecessitateadequate
cognitive work.
Experiment 4 further explores the issue of how much interpre-
tive work is necessary: are schematic interpretations effective only
when children form one for themselves or even when children are
simply told how to interpret a scene? How much cognitive work is
necessary to foster future relational generalization? Perhaps sim-
ply the act of interpreting an ambiguous scene is cognitive work
enough.
EXPERIMENT 4
Whenthelabel“sharing”isappliedtothesescenes,childrenmaybe
interpretingthescenebasedontheirpastexperienceswithsharing
and the scenes in theVaguely related condition have enough com-
ponents to foster a relevant interpretation. In Experiment 4, we
made it highly difﬁcult for children to interpret scenes accord-
ing to the labels themselves. This was done by switching the
meaningfullabels(usedinpreviousexperiments)andscenessuch
that the word “sharing” was applied to the pulling cards and the
word “pulling” used with the sharing cards. To examine whether
schematic interpretations are effective when children are simply
told how to interpret a scene,in one condition (the Story-Schema
condition),weprovidedanappropriateinterpretationforthechil-
dren.Foreachtrainingcard,theexperimenterbrieﬂytolda“story”
that explained the ﬁt between the label and the perceptual situa-
tion. As a control to this condition, in the Unrelated condition,
children were given the same switched labels and cards as the
Story-Schema condition, but critically were not provided with a
relevant interpretation.
METHOD
Participants
Twenty-four children, average age 59months (range 49–
67months)fromIndianadaycaresparticipatedinthisexperiment.
ChildrenwererandomlyassignedtoeithertheUnrelated(control,
n =12) or Story-Schema condition (n =12). Two additional chil-
dren were tested but presented a side bias, only choosing cards
presented on one side.
Materials and procedure
ThetrainingcardswerethesamecardsusedExperiments1and2as
well as theVaguely related condition of Experiment 3. In contrast
to previous studies, the symmetrical cards picturing stuffed ani-
mals (e.g.,cross–penguin–cross) were now labeled“pulling”while
the asymmetrical cards depicting vehicles were labeled “sharing”
in both conditions of the current experiment. In the Unrelated-
controlcondition,experimenterslabeledthesecardswiththesame
procedure as previous studies. In the Story-Schema condition,
experimentersgaveaone-sentencestorytogoalongwiththelabel.
For example, an experimenter would hold up the asymmetrical
car–diamond–diamond card and say,“This is a sharing card. See,
thiscardissharing.Look,thediamondsaregoingtosharethecar.”
For a symmetrical card,such as the cross–penguin–cross card,the
experimenter would say, “This is a pulling card. See, this card is
pulling. Look,the penguin is pulling the crosses closer.”
After the training sequence, the testing phase of the study
began. The memory and generalization trials were similar to
previous experiments. Participants in both conditions were pre-
sented with the same cards and asked the same questions. As in
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the previous experiments, generalization trials were blocked into
dimension-speciﬁc groups and were presented in one of three
pseudo-random orders. The critical difference in this study was
that the relationally matching“sharing”cards are all asymmetrical
and“pulling”cards are symmetrical.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
A2(test:memory,generalization)×2(training:Unrelated,Story-
schema) repeated-measures ANOVA revealed no main effect of
test, F(1, 22)=0.32, nor an interaction, F(1, 22)=0.51, but
there was a signiﬁcant main effect of condition, F(1, 22)=18.99,
p<0.001, partial η2 =0.46. Children performed signiﬁcantly
better in the Story-schema condition (see Table 4).
LessthanhalfofthechildrenintheUnrelatedcondition(n =5)
were able to answer more than 0.75 (6 out of 8) of memory
trials correctly compared to 11 out of 12 children in the Story-
schemacondition,χ2(1,n =24)=4.11,p<0.05.LikeExperiment
1, these signiﬁcant differences in memorization could be driving
differences in generalization. An ANCOVA revealed that mem-
ory performance was not a signiﬁcant covariate, F(1, 21)=1.13,
and training condition was a marginally signiﬁcant factor, F(1,
21)=4.23,p<0.06,partial η2 =0.16. The Schema-story training
facilitated both children’s memorization of the initial instances
and their generalization of the learned pattern.
The Schema-story apparently enabled these children to inter-
pret the pictured events in new ways and to generalize those
interpretations,aresultthatprovidessupportforboththeSchema
HypothesisandtheOptimalVaguenesshypothesis.Childreninthe
Schema-storyconditionweretoldhowtointerpretthecardsrather
thanhavingtoformaninterpretationthemselves(althoughapply-
ing this interpretation most likely did require some mental work)
and they exhibited superior performance to children who simply
receivedthelabels.Thisresultstronglysuggeststhatthekeyishav-
ing an interpretation that makes sense. One of the difﬁculties for
theUnrelatedconditionmaybethatitwastoodifﬁculttointerpret
a car–diamond–diamond scene as a“sharing”scene without some
additional information. So, the insight of the Schema hypothe-
sis still holds, that children need some background information
(either from their own experiences or provided by an external
source) to interpret a scene relationally. Although applying the
given interpretation to the perceptual situation at hand may be
slightly odd (diamonds sharing a car?),it may be that the oddness
providessomeopportunityforthechildtoworkouthowthisper-
ceptualsituationinstantiatessharing.Thereinliesthecontribution
of the Optimal Vagueness hypothesis: perhaps to appropriately
make use of a schema, the ﬁt between the story and the situation
may be better left vague and unexplained in order to promote
Table 4 | Means (and SDs) from the training conditions of
Experiment 4.
Memory trials Generalization trials n
Unrelated label 0.61 (0.26) 0.62 (0.20) 12
Story-schema with label 0.92* (0.17) 0.86* (0.14) 12
*Performance that statistically differed from chance (0.5) at p<0.001.
interpretation and thus generalization. This experiment suggests
thatthebeneﬁtof workmaynotbethesheereffortexertedinﬁnd-
ing an interpretation but simply the mental work of interpreting a
scene, even if that interpretation is provided by someone else.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The studies in this paper used lexical generalization as a measure
of how much young children represent the deep structural simi-
laritiespresentinanarraywhenlearninghowwordsrelatetothese
arrays.Thekeyhypothesiswasthatwordspromotethediscoveryof
relationsbyevokingwell-knowneventstructures,therebyrelating
this phenomena in relational reasoning to children’s ﬂexible rea-
soning about well-known events. However, the key for relational
generalization is to represent the relation in a variable-ized way
such that very different kinds of entities can be seen as standing in
the same relational role. This suggests that an event structure that
ﬁtstoowellwiththedepictedsituation,withstereotypicentitiesin
the relational roles, does not promote generalization. The present
results provide support for both the Schema-evoking hypothesis
and the Optimal Vagueness corollary. By using words and scenes
that vaguely evoke event structures familiar to young children,
labeltrainingboostedattentiontorelationsandfosteredrelational
generalization.
Two aspects of schemas motivated the design of these exper-
iments: using words to activate schematic interpretations and
using scenes conducive to schematic interpretation. The con-
nection between language, schemas, and generalization is an old
one but the direction of application in these experiments is new.
Originally in the 1970s, schemas (and scripts and frames) were
hypothesized as constructs to explain language comprehension
(e.g., Minsky, 1975; Rumelhart, 1975; Schank and Abelson, 1977;
Charniak,1978). Individuals could interpret ambiguous language
inthecontextof theseschemasthatrepresentedeventsintermsof
actors,actions,andobjectsinhighlylikelyspatialortemporalrela-
tions. These classic ideas motivated the Schema hypothesis,which
was supported by our results showing how the use of well-known
words with structured meanings can bring about generalizable
interpretations of ambiguous situations.
In their original conception, schemas were generalizable
because of the presence of mental variables or slots that could be
ﬁlledinbyasetof options.Developmentalresearchershavefound
that children’s knowledge for familiar events are often formu-
lated in such ways,highlighting relational structure and including
optionalandvariableinformation(i.e.NelsonandGruendel,1981;
Mandler, 1983; Hudson and Nelson, 1986). For well-understood
events such as birthday parties, children provide general knowl-
edge, such as expectancy that games will be played, and provide
speciﬁcoptions,suchaspin-the-tail-on-the-donkeyasﬁllerforthe
“games” slot. This was the motivation for the Optimal Vagueness
hypothesis; that schemas were useful because they were meaning-
ful but at the same time, not ﬁxed nor too speciﬁc. In the present
experiments, we used arrays with simple abstract elements in the
roles. The beneﬁt of these arrays – over richer ones – for children’s
relational reasoning supports the idea that too much emphasis on
speciﬁc ﬁllers draws attention away from the schematic structure.
Thus, less vibrant and loosely ﬁtting ﬁllers seems to leave more
attentional resources available for processing relational structure.
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The Schema and Optimal Vagueness hypotheses, when con-
sidered together, suggest a “sweet spot” for generalization. The
Optimal Vagueness perspective suggests that there should not be
too many particulars or concrete details involved in the labeling
experienceelsegeneralizationmaysuffer.ButtheSchemahypoth-
esis shows a need for enough cues to activate relevant background
information to provide appropriate interpretation and facilitate
learning. The following discussion explores these two ends and
their implications.
WHEN LEARNING INSTANCES ARE TOO SPECIFIC
Generally, concrete and rich representations have more informa-
tion than sparse ones and the natural consequence is that only
some of this information gets learned. Concreteness is relevant to
Experiment 3, in which a perceptually more detailed depiction of
aneventcalled“sharing”(or“pulling”)resultsinlesstransferthan
amoreschematicdepiction.Althoughlearningfromconcreterep-
resentations can be beneﬁcial, it can also be problematic for three
reasons. First, learners may not understand that these details are
optional,creatingacharacterizationof thesituationthatisunnec-
essarily tied to its originating context (Goldstone and Sakamoto,
2003).Thesecondreason,relatedtotheﬁrst,inthatspeciﬁcinter-
esting details may compete against, and often overwhelm, subtle
relational information (Uttal et al.,1997; DeLoache,2000). Lastly,
even relevant details may affect the appreciation of similarity to
other isomorphic instances (Sloutsky et al., 2005; Kaminski et al.,
2008).
Children and other learners do not a priori realize what they
are supposed to learn from an experience. Given that concrete
details of objects are typically more salient than relational infor-
mation,particularlyforyoungchildren(GentnerandRattermann,
1991), when these details are available, they are encoded more
readily. Young children’s immediate recall memory for speciﬁc
details is better than recall of general structure (Slackman and
Nelson, 1984; Sloutsky and Fisher, 2004). Studies of young chil-
dren’s attention, such as the often used card sort task devised by
Zelazo et al. (1995, 1996), show that when attention is already
directed toward some feature or dimension, it is difﬁcult for
children to overcome this “attentional inertia” (Kirkham et al.,
2003) when they are required to switch to another dimension.
In the card sort task, the dimensions (typically color and shape)
are initially fairly equal in saliency. If information is unequal
in saliency, as in the case of concrete details versus relations,
it is reasonable to think that young children will have an even
harder time focusing their attention on the less salient relations.
In the case of highly detailed training cards, children may not
have even noticed the perceptual symmetry portrayed in the situ-
ation in lieu of more salient object details. The mere presence of
many features in the Speciﬁcally related girl–penguin–girl scene
that overlapped with the label “sharing” may have made it dif-
ﬁcult for children to notice the symmetrical structure also in
the scene. Thus, picking out and responding to relational infor-
mation is often easier with sparser instances (Rattermann et al.,
1990;GentnerandRattermann,1991).Conﬂatingconcretedetails
and abstract relations makes relational reasoning difﬁcult even
for adults (Goldstone and Sakamoto, 2003; Son and Goldstone,
2009).
DeLoache and colleagues (DeLoache, 1995, 2000; Uttal et al.,
1999) have stressed the importance of competing concrete and
symbolic construals. Concrete objects can be considered as inter-
esting objects in their own right or as symbolic stand-ins for
somethingelse,andwhenconcretepropertiesareintensiﬁed,then
symbolicconstrualssuffer.Inschematerms,thissymbolic“stands-
for” insight is the idea of a slot to be ﬁlled in by something
else. This representational insight may be the key step to gen-
eralization, with learners’ appreciation that many ﬁllers can be
placed in a slot. A particularly relevant example of this compe-
tition between interesting details and relational information is
in the domain of math manipulatives. Although educators are
generally in favor of concrete manipulatives (Ball, 1992; Moyer,
2001; Kennedy et al., 2007), some researchers suggest that this
growing enthusiasm should be paralleled with a better under-
standing of what children actually learn and generalize from
manipulatives (Uttal et al., 1997). Stevenson and Stigler (1994)
observe that American math teachers will use anything inter-
esting, from “marbles, Cheerios, M&Ms, checkers, poker chips,
or plastic animals,” sometimes even in a single lesson. The gen-
eral attitude seems to be that more information, more detailed
examples, and more interest in math activities (i.e., counting
M&Ms matters to children more so than counting notches on
paper) are important. However, if the goal of math education is
to direct attention to structure, perhaps less interesting and less
concrete learning examples may serve better. The OptimalVague-
ness hypothesis is more consistent with the simple tiles used by
Japanese teachers (Stevenson and Stigler,1994). The tiles are con-
creteandfamiliarinthattheyarephysicalmanipulativesandused
repeatedly, however they are not vivid or particularly interesting
objects.
One might object to these criticisms of concrete details,claim-
ing that the reason richly interesting items, such as M&Ms,
do not beneﬁt learning is that what is interesting about these
items is irrelevant to the structure of the learning situation.
This criticism, however, cannot account for the ﬁndings from
Experiment 3 (see also Kaminski et al., 2008). In that experi-
ment, the relations between the rich objects were highly relevant
to understanding the schema and could have even fostered a
better understanding of the balance or asymmetry in the situa-
tion. That is, the Speciﬁcally related training cards were designed
to be more accurate instances of “sharing” and “pulling” than
the other training cards. The Speciﬁcally related training cards,
having three objects concretely related to “sharing,” provided
an excellent example of sharing, yet did not allow the label
to generalize to sparser versions of the same relation such as
diamond–circle–diamond.
One of the fundamental problems with speciﬁcity may be that
the presence of speciﬁc details changes the similarity relations
between the learning cards and the generalization cards. In this
study, the dissimilarity was obvious: there were no simple shapes
on the Speciﬁcally related training cards and all generalization
cards consisted of three simple shapes; all other training cards
had at least two simple shapes. But more generally, the addition
of details introduces more dissimilarity to future instances. The
simplicity of abstract formalisms or simpliﬁed representations,
only expressing sparse structure,allows them to be equally similar
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to (and equally far from) many instances (Son and Goldstone,
2009). Because abstractions have less information, and in par-
ticular less contrasting dissimilarities (Tversky, 1977; Bassok and
Holyoak, 1989), they capture a prototype-like representation that
anchors many instances,which may be dissimilar from each other
but equally similar to the prototype (see Son et al., 2008 f o rat e s t
of this hypothesis in children’s shape generalization). The cen-
tral role of vague,simpliﬁed representations for learning may also
explainwhyheavyrelianceonspeciﬁcexamplesoftenleadstopoor
understanding (Chi et al., 1989).
WHEN LEARNING INSTANCES ARE TOO VAGUE
After listing the disadvantages of highly speciﬁc learning scenar-
ios, one might conclude that for generalization, the more abstract,
the better. However, the present results as well as other studies
clearly document children’s (and adults’) difﬁculties with abstract
formalisms (e.g., Lave, 1988; Nunes et al., 1993). After all, merely
including two simple shapes in the training cards was not enough
to foster generalization to cards with simple shapes (the Arbi-
trary and Iconic label conditions from Experiment 1, and the
Unrelated conditions from Experiments 2–4). The notion of
optimal vagueness offered here suggests that learning instances
can be too vague. For example, future studies should address
whether applying “sharing” to simple shapes such as diamond–
circle–diamond would be effective for generalization. After all,
if generalization is merely a case of similarity, then such train-
ing should produce the best levels of generalization to new cards
with triples of simple shapes. If such training is ineffective, it
may be that such a situation is difﬁcult to organize according
to relational information because it does not sufﬁciently evoke
richly relevant information. One immediate advantage of hav-
ing toys in “sharing” scenes and vehicles in “pulling” scenes is
that they provide scaffolding that partly overlaps with children’s
past experiences with these actions. Exactly because the struc-
tural information conveyed to the young participants is hidden
among these details, children could have simply remembered
that the label “sharing” goes with the toy cards and “pulling”
with vehicle ones. However, that alone could not have resulted
in better generalization to scenarios that do involve toys or
vehicles.
Anadditionaldisadvantageof“toomuchvagueness”isdemon-
strated by Experiment 1’s iconic label condition. As useful as
a slot-like variable representation of a situation might be, a
highly impoverished one, such as the “ko-li-ko” label, did not
foster as much generalization as a meaningful label. The iconic
labels made use of syllabic isomorphism for things that are the
same on the ends (“ko”) and something different in the mid-
dle (“li”). But perhaps the relation is not even noticed, as seems
likely in the present case (that is, that children did not even
noticetheparallelrelationalstructureof themimeticforms).This
notion of too much vagueness might similarly explain Gick and
Holyoak’s (1983) results showing less analogical generalization
when participants were provided with an explicit (but abstract)
statement of the underlying principle of a story than from expo-
sure to multiple analogs. This abstract principle for these adults
and “ko-li-ko” for children may just be too vague to activate
relevant knowledge. Thus, the key to relational insights more
generally may be building up or activating relevant past knowl-
edge with slot-like schemas. Consistent with this idea, Gick and
Holyoak found that when learners produced their own state-
ment of the underlying principle after exposure to multiple
analogs, this schema was highly predictive of subsequent transfer.
Thus, in their study, a general schema created from more spe-
ciﬁc instances produced transfer. Perhaps in the current studies,
the use of “sharing” allowed multiple past instances to be acti-
vated and thus aided the formation of a relationally appropriate
interpretation.
The real advantage of initial concreteness may be this: that
schemas can be created from them. The process of forming a
schema may be important to beneﬁts in generalization. If this
is the case, the advantages of concreteness may be particularly
critical early in learning. Goldstone and Son (2005) have pro-
posedapedagogicalmethodof“concretenessfading”whereinitial
instancesarehighlyconcretebutaregraduallyidealizedovertime.
By initially presenting easily understood concrete ideas along with
more abstract ideas, and then fading away those concrete details,
this method eases a learner into a more abstract construal. This
may be an effective teaching methodology because it instantiates
a schematization process. Initially, during label training, our par-
ticipants may have been more reliant on the concrete details but
taking away the toy in the middle during the impoverished gener-
alization trials may have fostered a “faded” understanding of the
learning instances.
A related idea is “progressive alignment” by Gentner and col-
leagues(KotovskyandGentner,1996;GentnerandMedina,1998)
which uses alignment of concretely similar situations to foster
comparison,a process shown to highlight commonalities,discard
deviations, and result in schema-like representations (Markman
andGentner,1993).Presumably,ifchildrenhaveexperiencesshar-
ing desirable toys, they may be able to effectively align their past
experiences with the ambiguous one in front of them in order to
createaschematicinterpretation.However,if alignmentof partsis
critical for schematic interpretation, the relational construal cre-
atedheremaynotbeﬂexibleenoughtogeneralizetolessalignable
instances. For example, if lining up objects is critical to under-
standingABArelations,then“sharing”asappliedtoABAinstances
may not extend to instances such as AABAA or even ABBA or
ABCBA. If alignment is not critical,optimally vague learning may
be less “slot-like” and instead more like an image. In such a case,
perhapsanyinstancewithsomethingvaguelydifferentinthemid-
dle, such as a single large isosceles triangle, could be considered
“sharing.”
CONCLUSION
The present studies, in addition to expanding on the role of
words and schemas in fostering relational construals, are poten-
tially important to a fundamental understanding of the meaning
of words. In other studies where words beneﬁt relational reason-
ing (i.e., “Daddy” from Gentner and Rattermann, 1991;“ E v e n ”
from Kotovsky and Gentner, 1996; “Top/Middle/Bottom” from
Loewenstein and Gentner, 2005), it might be tempting to think
that the meaning of particular words is the source of the facilita-
tion. The present results suggest that while meaning matters, the
relevant meaning for generalizing relational concepts may be an
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“interpretation” that can be bent to ﬁt multiple instances. Words
that are related to well-ordered schemas allow children to take on
a relational perspective – but that perspective must be applied to
a situation that is conducive to developing relational meaning. As
accounts of language can contribute to a better understanding of
analogical reasoning, so also can an account of creating relational
similarity contribute to better accounts of language.
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